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PART I

SECRETARY'S OFFICE
JULY 19-26, 1962

MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION

Date: July 23, 1962
Time: 4:15 p.m.
Place: US Mission Annex, Geneva

Participants:

United States

The Secretary
Mr. Kohler
Mr. Holloway

Germany

Foreign Minister Schroeder
State Secretary Carstens
Mr. Kusterer, Interpreter

Subject: Talks with Gromyko on Berlin

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Foreign Minister Schroeder called on the Secretary by appointment just before his departure for Bonn to discuss the recent talks with Soviet Foreign Minister Gromyko on the Berlin problem.

The Secretary opened by saying that Gromyko seemed less insistent in the July 22 talk than he had in the July 21 talk. However, the Secretary cautioned that we must be careful not to exaggerate this atmosphere. Pravda had carried some hard line articles, which had been published while the Secretary has been in Geneva, and we must definitely consider Pravda as part of the atmosphere. The Secretary said that to him an important fact had been that Gromyko had avoided an answer to the Secretary's direct question whether the presence of Western troops in Berlin and their access thereto would in any way be affected by signature of a peace treaty with the GDR by the Soviets and some other states. But, both times Gromyko fell back on the formulation that in such a case the Western powers would have to make arrangements with a

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sovereign GDR, not the USSR, on all issues of interest to them including access. This seemed to indicate either that Gromyko had no instructions to go beyond this formulation or that the Soviet Government has yet to make up its mind what to do. As to the question of what's next, Gromyko had responded to the Secretary's suggestion to think about the conversation overnight by inviting the Secretary the next morning to come to lunch on July 24. The Secretary said that Gromyko is aware that the Secretary plans to be in Washington to give a dinner for Prince Souvanna on July 26.

The Secretary said he also wanted to tell the Foreign Minister that as far as he knew stories appearing in the German press predicting an imminent summit meeting were pure speculation. There has been no discussion in the conversations thus far of a summit meeting.

Minister Schroeder said that he had seen the press today, and had tried to give the impression that the Soviets had not made a strong stand at Geneva, particularly in that they had set no deadline for signature of the peace treaty. He had hoped by this interview to counter the impression which the Soviets seemed to be making on world opinion that it is the West which is under pressure.

The Foreign Minister also said that the report of the briefing given to the Ambassadorial group in Washington on the last talk by the Secretary and Soviet Ambassador Dobrynin on July 12 and the report he had received of the July 22 talk had raised a problem for him. He was somewhat concerned that the impression will be created that there is only the troop issue outstanding and that once this is solved other matters such as border issues, nuclear weapons, etc., will automatically be settled. This would create a pressure on the West to compromise on the troop issue because it would suggest that Berlin is the only element in an agreement which is lacking in a solution. The Soviets may be leading us in that direction by their apparently reasonable proposals to leave the Western troops for a period of four years, to be reduced by a similarly reasonable formula over this period. The Minister thought this was somewhat of a psychological tactic of the Soviets and that it seemed to be having some effect.

The Secretary replied that the Soviets are using some of Hitler's tactics against us by suggesting that if just one more concession is granted, e.g. Saarland, Austria, etc., this will lead to a final solution. The Secretary wanted to stress that there had been no serious and systematic discussions with the Soviets on other matters connected with Berlin. They already knew for example that their concept of a ban on nuclear weapons to multilateral groups was unacceptable. They must also be aware that we see the idea of a NATO-Warsaw Pact non-aggression treaty as only coming at the end of a very long road. The Secretary said that the dangers involved for us in appearing to argue only on the Soviet terms suggest to him that we

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review our political planning to see if we perhaps might bring about a campaign for renewed emphasis on such matters as self-determination.

The Secretary said he also wanted to mention his feeling that we should review our military planning in connection with this political review. He thought the planning in various fields should be more closely interrelated. Some of the military planning seems to be rather abstract, based perhaps too much on a feeling that this is "something that may happen," but which does not seem real at this moment. He also felt that we must look more into the question of economic countermeasures. The trade of Eastern Europe with the West now comes to \$8 billion annually. The whole question of planning and countermeasures might be reviewed particularly the question of sequence of actions because in the event of crisis there would probably be little time for consultation. When the Foreign Minister observed that Khrushchev would be on leave next month, the Secretary reminded him that he had been on leave last August 13.

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